Drivers of populism: economic insecurity or cultural backlash? From individual attitudes toward migration to the dynamics of political competition by Gottardi, Francesco
Leiden University, MSc thesis in Political Science: Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Development
   
 
Drivers of populism: economic insecurity or 
cultural backlash?1 
From individual attitudes toward migration to the dynamics of 
political competition  
 
June 11, 2018 
 
Francesco Gottardi (s2103206) 
  
Thesis supervisor: Dr. M. B. Longo 
Second reader: Dr. M. S. Spirova 
Abstract 
Populism has come to the center stage of the European political arena more than ever. Understanding 
this phenomenon has become a priority, the way to do it, however, is not clear. In this paper, we 
propose to analyze individual opinions toward migration as a proxy for the demand for populism in 
three countries where this issue is perceived as highly relevant (Austria, Germany and Hungary). We 
investigate the determinants of these opinions on the basis of two alternative theories (economic 
insecurity versus cultural backlash), and find that the weight of cultural and identity factors 
overcomes the one of the economic factors. On the basis of this result, we move to study the dynamics 
of political competition (supply side of populism) in these same countries. We see that populist parties 
that have responded to this demand by putting more emphasis on the cultural (libertarian-
authoritarian) issues in their political agenda have been more successful, in line with our conjectures. 
This finding provides useful implications for the design of strategies of traditional parties in response 
to populism. 
                                                          
1 I am very dreadful to my supervisor for his continuous support and helpful advice through the process of my 
thesis. I also wish to thank Alessandro Gasparotti, Alvise Pedron, Chiara Rapallini and Simone Tedeschi for 
their help in accessing the database and for their useful suggestions on the statistical analysis. 
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     1    Introduction and research question 
Are citizens hostile to migrants because they take away their jobs or because they are 
culturally diverse? How do these opinions affect political competition in the era of populism? 
This work aims to provide some answers to these questions that have become increasingly 
compelling in the European political arena. After having evidenced that migration is a strong 
leverage for populism, our first objective is to explore the channels through which personal 
opinions on migration develop. In this regard, the existing literature has provided two main 
competing (but not mutually exclusive) explanations: one that argues the importance of 
economic factors (and in particular, economic insecurity) as drivers of these opinions; the 
other that surmises the centrality of cultural diversity and value changes. 
To achieve our purposes, we have done a comparative analysis of this issue for Austria, 
Germany and Hungary, countries that are socioeconomically and culturally comparable, but 
still different with regard to the political discussion on migration, migration facts and policies 
as well as the growth of populism (induced, among other factors, by migration itself). By 
using a regression model that studies individual attitudes toward migration as a proxy for the 
demand for populism, we found that cultural factors carry overall more weight as 
determinants of such demand in these countries in the last fifteen years. 
Our second objective is then to analyze the dynamics of political competition and party 
positioning in the same countries (supply of populism) on the basis of this result. 
Interestingly, we observe that populist parties proved able to intercept the individual demand 
by leveraging on the cultural (libertarian-authoritarian) debate way more than traditional 
parties. Moreover, this pattern seems to find confirmation also beyond the countries 
considered. 
Building on the paper’s findings, we draw the two following conclusions for the parties 
aiming to contrast the growth of populism. First, in order to satisfy an increasing demand, the 
importance of culture and identity themes in the current political debate cannot be neglected. 
Second, it is necessary to reconcile this demand with the values of tolerance and pluralism 
while addressing the needs of citizens left behind, who are more sensitive to populism. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature on populism, 
migration and individual attitudes. In Section 3 the two alternative theories (economic 
insecurity versus cultural backlash) are presented and some of their implications are 
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discussed. We then describe the method of the empirical analysis pursued in our paper 
(Section 4). Section 5 reports and discusses the estimates of our regression model for 
individual attitudes, while Section 6 examines the dynamics of political competition and 
verifies the robustness of our findings. Finally, Section 7 provides some concluding remarks. 
 
    2    Literature review 
The serious systemic crisis affecting traditional parties in western democracies is an 
established concept (Cerruto e Facello, 2014; Bale and Partus, 2014) and has been 
accompanied by the simultaneous growth of anti-establishment parties. This shift has been 
possible due to the ability of extreme (often on the right) parties to answer the demands arisen 
under post-industrialism and ideology crisis not satisfied by incumbent parties (Ignazi, 1996). 
In a more recent work, Rodrik (2017) identifies in the dynamics of economic globalization 
the main factor that has been fostering the populist spiral (a fact also supported by Ferguson, 
2016), distinguishing “between left-wing and right-wing variants of populism, which differ 
with respect to the societal cleavages that populist politicians highlight and render salient” 
(p.2). The core of his argument relies on the general overuse of economic integration, which 
has brought to invasive trade agreements and to a systematic removal of restrictions on 
capital mobility, thus favoring the demand for step-back countermeasures such as a more 
rigid control of borders. 
Conversely, Brubaker (2017), though not refuting the protectionist nature of populism, argues 
that this phenomenon must be essentially reconducted inside the dynamics of political 
competition, favored by the ongoing crisis of institutional mediation. In fact, according to the 
author, populism builds its success on the leverages of returning power to the people, calling 
for simplicity against the complexity of the structures of governance, and on a claim of 
exceptionality in comparison to the traditional forces from which people are getting detached 
(a claim that is hard to sustain when populists come to power, thus giving place to further 
cynicism and distrust that can be exploited by new populist forces). What, however, is 
beyond dispute among the abovementioned scholars is that the support for populist parties 
has been increasing over time and actually is at its historic highs. 
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Certainly, the channels through which populism is building its success are multiple. But 
among them, migration represents a special case. First, the hostility to migration flows and 
open policies is often considered to be the trump card of the populist forces in catalyzing 
public discontent and disorientation (Mudde, 2013; Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart, 2017; 
Muis and Immerzeel, 2017), since the work of Ignazi (1996), who correctly identified that (p. 
560) “the defense of the national community from foreigners […] responds to the identity 
crisis produced by atomization”. That migration plays a central role in the recent political 
debate is not only well acknowledged in the literature (Mayda, 2006; Ceobanu and Escandell, 
2010), but also a widely observed fact, both among citizens2 and among political leaders3. 
Furthermore, due to the great variability across countries and over time of the migration 
phenomenon and of its related policies, the explanatory power of this channel is considerable. 
In contrast, for other drivers of populism (as suggested by Mounk, 2018: economic crisis, 
nationalism, democratic detachment and mistrust of European institutions) it is harder to find 
analogous variations over time and across countries. 
Therefore, it should not surprise that there is an increasing number of works that study the 
dynamics of populism exploiting migration-related issues and the response of individuals as 
feeders of those dynamics (Facchini and Mayda, 2008; Inglehart and Norris, 2016). In 
particular, these works, which will be examined in greater detail in the continuation of our 
paper, highlight the importance of analyzing individual opinions toward migration and of 
understanding their main determinants as drivers of a more general demand for populism (see 
also Dennison and Talò, 2017). Moving from these considerations, other scholars (Guiso et 
al., 2017) studied the responses of parties on the supply side in terms of political competition 
and party repositioning. Our studies follows both lines presented in this paragraph. 
 
    3    Theoretical Framework 
Particularly inspired from the works of Facchini and Mayda (2008) and of Inglehart and 
Norris (2016), we focus on individual attitudes toward migration in order to understand the 
                                                          
2 See Figure 2 (p. 8). 
3 French President Macron and German Chancellor Merkel remarked in the last months that a big share of the 
game against populism will be played in the field of migratory policies (see: 
http://www.france24.com/en/20180316-live-angela-merkel-paris-talks-with-emmanuel-macron-eurozone-
reforms). 
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demand for populism coming from individuals in the society. These scholars propose two 
alternative hypotheses or lines of argument to explain these opinions: a first one which calls 
for the major role of economic factors and a second one more focused on the importance of 
cultural values. Both arguments agree that migration and its perceived impact considerably 
amplify the effects of the stated factors on individual opinions. The latter, in turn, feed into 
the demand for populism (Figure 1). How to respond to this demand, however, depends on 
which of the two arguments carries more weight. 
 
Figure 1. From societal factors to populism: mechanism of the demand. 
 
 
 
 
3.1   Economic insecurity theory 
A popular line of thought argues that economic drivers are the most important factors 
influencing citizens’ opinions toward migration (Facchini and Mayda, 2008, whose work 
follows an approach close to the structure we propose and will be examined more in detail in 
Section 4.2; Guiso et al., 2017). In particular, Guiso et. al (2017, p. 41) write that nowadays 
“the rare combination of inability of markets and governments to provide security has shaken 
the confidence in traditional political parties and institutions, fostering fears that are 
aggravated by threats such as mass immigration”. The underlying mechanism is rather simple 
and centered on economic insecurity. As Facchini and Mayda (2008, p. 668) point out: “if 
immigrants are on average unskilled relative to natives, through the labor-market channel 
they will hurt unskilled natives and benefit skilled ones, as their arrival will induce an 
increase in the skilled wage and a decrease in the unskilled wage”, and vice versa. Therefore, 
if this channel is the main determinant, we should observe that negative attitudes toward 
migrants are negatively correlated with the level of individual skills when migration is 
Determinants:
-Economic factors
-Cultural factors
Outcome:
Individual attitudes
Demand for 
populism
Trigger: 
Migration 
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primarily unskilled. According to this line of argument, the main determinant of these 
attitudes is the fear of the negative effects that their arrival provokes on the economic 
conditions of unskilled natives. Moreover, immigration pressure is strongly correlated to high 
income gaps (particularly for unskilled workers) present between macro-regions of the world 
and that provide large economic incentives to migrate (Milanovic, 2012): these forces are 
likely to generate an increase of the flows and, likewise, of negative attitudes. These 
dynamics lay the foundation for the successful proliferation of populist anti-immigrant 
parties. As Guiso et al. (2017, p. 41) conclude: “populism does not have a cultural cause, but 
rather an economic insecurity cause, with an important and traceable cultural channel”. 
More precisely, when considering migrants from poorer countries as we are going to do in 
our study, we can state the following implications of the economic insecurity theory, in 
accordance to the work of Facchini and Mayda (2008). 
Averse opinions towards migration are expected to be: 
1. Negatively correlated with education: as argued above, low-skilled migrants endanger 
more the socioeconomic position of the unskilled cohorts of natives. Education is 
typically a good proxy for the skill components of individual workers. 
2. Negatively correlated with individual income and unemployment: poor low-skilled 
migrants compete with the poor cohorts of natives for welfare-state benefits. These 
variables catch the effect of this competition on attitudes. 
3. Positively correlated with age and political affiliation with the right: these 
determinants, though not being properly economic, seem nonetheless to carry weight 
to the extent that they encase economic insecurity concerns (the decreasing level of 
wages with age; the hardly controllable impact of migration on the leaner welfare 
state proposed by the economic right). 
Points 1 and 2 above suggest two sub-hypotheses for economic insecurity theory, based on 
whether the main area of economic competition from migrants concerns the labor market or 
the welfare state. 
Altogether, according to this theory, the natives most concerned about the low-skilled 
migrant should be those low-skilled and less educated, with experiences of unemployment or 
precarious jobs, relatively old and right-wing. 
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3.2   Cultural backlash theory 
An alternative thesis based on the primary role of cultural variables has been put forward in 
other works. In particular, Inglehart and Norris (2016, p. 29) theorize that “the spread of 
progressive values has also stimulated a cultural backlash among people who feel threatened 
by this development”. The authors provide two main points in support of this argument. First, 
Western societies are overindustrializing at great speed, a phenomenon that fosters 
continuous cultural changes to the detriment of traditional values. Second, the growing 
“immigration flows, especially from lower income countries, changed the ethnic makeup of 
these societies” (ib., p. 30), providing further threat to the same values. Therefore, a ‘silent 
counter-revolution’ occurred in their defense, opening the floodgates to nationalism, 
xenophobia, aversion to the political class that allowed this cultural outcome (Deangelis, 
2003; see also Ignazi, 1996). In a word, to populist parties, which, from this perspective, 
seem to have built their success on socio-psychological factors rather than on merely 
economic ones. In this regard, migration is exploited by the right-populist rhetoric to provide 
evidence of a traditional culture increasingly undermined. 
Therefore, the argument developed by Inglehart and Norris (2016) yields the conjectures that 
adverse opinions toward migration from poorer countries are: 
1. Positively correlated with the importance attributed by individuals to preserve 
traditional values in a country: as just explained, this is the field where the ‘silent 
counter-revolution’ is taking place. 
2. Positively correlated with political detachment and governance mistrust: this claim 
follows a similar line as the preceding one, since institutions are considered 
responsible of this weakening of traditions. 
3. Positively correlated with authoritarian values (safety, need for a guide) in which, 
conversely, people put their trust. 
4. Positively correlated with right-wing positions: this is in accordance to the economic 
insecurity theory, but in this case the line of argument is based on the expected 
capacity of right-wing parties to defend the country from the multicultural threat. 
5. Negatively correlated with education and positively correlated with age: the first 
variable tends to be associated with tolerance and cultural diversity, while the second 
one is highly related with importance of traditions and difficulty to adapt to an 
7 
 
evolving world. Again, for these variables the implications are the same of the 
economic argument, but the related explanation is different. 
Notice that in this case, differently from before, it is difficult to identify distinct channels or 
sub-hypotheses through which cultural backlash operates. 
From the above considerations, it is finally important to underline that the economic 
insecurity theory and the cultural backlash theories are not mutually exclusive, but to some 
extent can reinforce each other, as recognized by the same authors (Facchini and Mayda, 
2008; Guiso et al., 2017; Inglehart and Norris, 2016). Moreover, it has been argued that each 
of them has a different explanatory power depending on the specificities of the macro-area 
considered (Rodrik, 2017). Where the two theories disagree, however, is with regard to the 
relative weight of these factors in explaining the anti-immigrant, populist sentiment. 
 
    4    Empirical strategy 
4.1   A cross-country comparison 
As argued in the previous sections, we believe that a cross-country comparative study would 
be particularly appropriate for our objectives. To this end, we intend to examine some 
countries where migration is currently considered one of the most compelling issues. This 
criterion is essential because, otherwise, migration could not be identified as a convincing 
proxy to study populism. Also, this consideration considerably reduces the number of 
candidate countries: in Europe, excluding microstates, migration is perceived as one of the 
two most urgent issues by at least the 30% of the population for Austria, Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Germany, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden and United 
Kingdom (Figure 2). In this set we selected Austria, Germany and Hungary (Figure 3), for the 
following reasons. 
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Figure 2. Fraction of the population considering immigration one of the two most urgent issues among European citizens, 
2015 (source: Eurobarometer). 
 
 
Figure 3. “What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment (11/2015)?”: 
Austria (light blue), Germany (blue) and Hungary (yellow). Source: Eurobarometer. 
  
 
The choice of the first two countries is straightforward: they are culturally and economically 
similar but still with important differences in their migratory policies which in turn lay the 
foundation for different populist outcomes. Conversely, at first sight, one may argue that 
Hungary is not easily comparable to Austria and Germany due to its post-communist 
background (something that is shared only with the Eastern part of Germany). On the other 
hand, it shares with the other two countries the property of not having a colonial heritage and 
with Austria the Austro-Hungarian past. Moreover, with regard to the importance of 
migration, Hungary represents a rather unique case. Even more than Austria, the anti-
immigrant sentiment of its people is very high and has been heavily exploited by the right-
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wing populist forces (Duncan, 2010). But, differently from Austria and Germany, the level of 
immigration in Hungary is very low, thus showing an apparently contrasting framework that 
already drew the attention of other scholars (Korkut, 2014). For these reasons, it seems more 
interesting to include in the comparison a country like Hungary with such peculiarities 
instead of eligible alternatives in terms of salience and comparability (as Denmark or 
Sweden), but even too homogeneous to Austria and Germany. 
We start by presenting some more general features (both at the macro and at the micro level) 
for the countries considered4. It seems clear that Austria, Germany and Hungary have some 
important ‘differences in similarity’ with regard to the facts concerning migration, migration 
policies and the related dynamics of electoral competition. At one hand we have a high-
immigration, (relatively) low-populism country (Germany), then a high-immigration, 
moderate-populism country (Austria) and finally a low-immigration, high-populism country 
(Hungary). 
 
Table 1. Migration: macro-data from Austria, Germany and Hungary. 
Data Austria Germany Hungary 
% immigrant 
population 
17,5 % 15% 4,5% 
% Non-EU immigrant 
population 
52% 63% 26% 
Skill level of immigrant 
population (% with 
low educational 
attainment) 
29% 35% 18% 
Integration index 48% 63% 46% 
“Official” migratory 
policy 
Close Recent opening Hostile 
Current vote shares of 
anti-immigrant, 
populist parties 
26% (FPÖ) 12,5% (AfD) 69% (Fidesz+Jobbik) 
 
Now we proceed to show what is the situation at the micro-level of individual opinions on 
migration (Figures 4-65). These charts reveal how finding migration an important issue, as 
                                                          
4 The data we report in Table 1 are taken from Eurostat and IOM (International Organization for Migration, both 
at 2015) with regard to migratory flows and from MIPEX (Migrant Integration Policies Index, at 2014; for a 
formal definition see mipex.eu) with regard to the integration index. For the classification of the migratory 
policies adopted by these countries we rely on Kraler (2011, for Austria), Borkert and Bosswick (2011, for 
Germany) and Drbohlav (2012, for Hungary). 
5 These histograms have been constructed on the basis of the ESS database, explained in detail in Section 4.2. 
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many people in these three countries do, does not imply having similar opinions on this topic. 
In fact, between-countries differences seem now strong and relevant: this overview depicts 
Germany as a country relatively benevolent towards immigrants from poorer countries, 
followed by Austria, more skeptical, and Hungary, clearly harsher. Second, with regard to the 
differences over time, Austria saw an increase of the share of individuals with more extreme 
views in both directions, while in Germany and in Hungary this is true only for the prevailing 
direction (respectively, ‘Allow many’ and ‘Allow none’). Third, in all the three countries the 
number of respondents without opinion (who replied ‘don’t know’) approximatively halved 
from 2002 to 2014, in accordance with the increased salience of this topic in the current 
political debate. 
 
Figure 4. Individual answers to the question: "Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe" in Austria 
(percentage values). 
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Figure 5. Individual answers to the question: "Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe" in 
Germany (percentage values). 
 
 
Figure 6. Individual answers to the question: "Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe" in 
Hungary (percentage values). 
 
 
Altogether, these findings are fairly in line with the macro-data presented in Table 1. Also at 
the individual level, Germany shows a considerable degree of openness to migration in a 
context where migration is already high. At the other end of the spectrum, Hungary reaffirms 
to be a low-migration country with every intention of preserving this status. Again, 
comparing Figures 4-6 to the vote shares of the parties with somewhat xenophobic views in 
these three countries (Table 1), we can immediately detect a clear parallel between these and 
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the individual opinions. After all, this should not surprise, since vote shares reflect citizens’ 
views, as mediated by the positioning of political parties. 
In the econometric analysis which follows (see Section 4.2 and Section 5), we aim precisely 
to understand the main factors that shapes individual opinions in these three different 
countries. 
4.2   Method of the econometric analysis 
We begin our analysis by describing the individual attitudes toward migration in the three 
countries considered and how they evolved over time (2002-2014). Next, to provide some 
answers to our research question, namely detecting the main determinants of these attitudes, 
we will carry out a quantitative study, analyzing a regression model for each of the same 
three countries. Several related studies we scrutinized also examine the determinants of 
individual attitudes (Glaser and Gilens, 1997; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Inglehart and 
Norris, 2016). In particular, Facchini and Mayda (2008) run an empirical investigation of the 
determinants of citizens’ opinions on immigration for a variety of countries and then examine 
how these attitudes translate into policy outcomes. Our study shares with these authors the 
aim to empirically understand the determinants of individual attitudes on migration (using a 
regression model) but presents some major differences regarding the period of the analysis, 
the choice of the countries considered and of the explanatory variables adopted. On this last 
point, as previously suggested, we will consider two main ‘families’ of possible determinants 
of individual attitudes, one concerning economic variables and the other regarding cultural 
variables. Migration-related variables are also relevant and play a role for both kinds of 
argument. 
To these objectives, we rely on the data available from the European Social Survey (ESS) and 
carry out a statistical analysis of these data using Stata. Since 2001, the ESS is one of the 
most comprehensive studies aiming to detect the attitudes and characteristics of the 
population of most of the European states. This database, whose reliability is widely 
recognized by various authors (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010; Inglehart and Norris, 2016), is 
well-suited for the countries and the periods we want to examine. As explained in the official 
website6, “The ESS works as a cross-sectional survey using probability samples which are 
representative of all persons aged 15 and over, resident within private households in each 
                                                          
6 http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/about/faq.html 
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country.” The questionnaire is administered every two years and is organized in a core 
section (politics, socio-demographics, subjective well-being…) and in a rotating section 
whose themes vary from round to round. The main theme we are interested in, attitudes 
regarding immigration, is part of the rotating section and was present in the questionnaire 
only in the 2002 and 2014 rounds. For these two periods, data are then available for all the 
three countries. This will allow us to carry out both a comparative analysis across the 
countries considered and to see how the situation has changed over time, particularly over the 
last 10-15 years which saw important developments in the situation regarding migration in 
Europe. We now present more in detail the variables we intend to select for our study. 
First, measures of attitudes towards migration (the dependent variable of our regression 
model, from now on, DV) can be derived using the answers to some of the questions of the 
ESS survey. In particular, the answers to the question “Allow many/few immigrants from 
poorer countries outside Europe” (with answers on a 1 to 4 scale, with 4 denoting the answer 
“Allow no immigrants”) appear appropriate to represent the DV. The choice of our DV draws 
inspiration from Facchini and Mayda (2008), who construct an analogous variable by 
resorting to the value surveys of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) database. 
Thanks to the exhaustiveness of the ESS database, several individual characteristics can also 
be employed as possible explanatory variables (from now on, EV) in the regression model. In 
particular, we will include a set of explanatory variables for each of the two hypotheses 
presented. The choice to focus primarily on individual-level variables, rather than on country-
level variables, appears natural, given our objective to understand individual attitudes, and is 
in line with most of the studies cited above (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart, 2007; Facchini 
and Mayda, 2008; Inglehart and Norris, 2016). For a more formal and detailed description of 
the variables considered, see Appendix 1. 
We first describe the variables that we can attribute primarily to the economic insecurity 
hypothesis. The two main variables in this category (analogously to Facchini and Mayda, 
2008) are the reported income of respondents and a variable related to their occupational 
status. The related answers in the ESS survey allow us to obtain measures for these variables. 
The same database enables us to include a further variable that seems potentially useful to our 
purposes since it is focused on the link between economic insecurity and immigration. This is 
obtained from the individual answers to the question “Qualification for immigration: work 
skills needed in the country”. 
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Next, we proceed analogously for the cultural backlash hypothesis, thus detecting a number 
of variables that relate to this argument. To construct these variables, we can still resort to the 
ESS, as already done by Inglehart and Norris (2016). The first one describes the importance 
attributed by respondents to follow traditions and national customs. The second one refers to 
their level of interest in politics as a reflection of the political culture of the country 
considered (Almond and Verba, 1965: the authors theorize three types of political culture 
based on the level of political participation in a society). Last, as for economic insecurity, we 
consider a variable that strictly connects culture and immigration, derived from the question: 
“Qualification for immigration: be white”. 
Finally, we include in our regression model a set of other variables which cannot be 
unambiguously attributed to only one of the two theories. As already mentioned in Section 3, 
economic insecurity and cultural backlash are not mutually exclusive and admit some 
overlaps. We conjecture that including these other variables is important to provide a more 
complete explanation of our DV, by reinforcing the statistical validity both of our model and 
of the aforementioned EVs. In this regard, we consider first two variables often used in social 
science research such as the age and the education level of the respondents. One may argue 
that elder people feel more threatened by immigrants, and more generally by globalization 
and this is true both for economic reasons, as they find it more difficult to adapt to the 
changing environment, and for cultural reasons7. Hence, it is hard to separate cultural and 
economic elements here. With regard to education, both Facchini and Mayda (2008) and 
Inglehart and Norris (2016) categorize it as an economic variable (education as proxy for 
skills), but it is debatable whether its link with culture is negligible. Hence, we decided more 
prudently not to attribute this variable exclusively to one of the two theories. Second, we 
include the following variables that appear more suitable for the cultural argument (Inglehart 
and Norris, 2016), though their economic component is still traceable: political ideology 
(self-positioning on a left-right scale), as well as measures of trust in institutions (politicians, 
European Union), of overall satisfaction (in government and democracy) and of authoritarian 
values (importance to follow rules and to live in safe and secure surroundings). 
We intend to run the regression model we described separately for Austria, Germany and 
Hungary, for 2002 and 2014. We surmise that the number and characteristics of available 
data (approximately 3000 individual observations for Germany and 1700 for Austria and 
                                                          
7 Robinson (2013) demonstrated that age has a positive correlation with conservative values which are in turn, 
as we are briefly going to show, positively related with aversion to migrants. 
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Hungary) allow to carry out a statistically meaningful analysis. This should enable us to 
describe possible changes in attitudes over time and then to detect how the relative weight of 
the determinants has evolved over time for the different countries. Given the increased 
importance of migration issues in Europe in the last years, this last point seems particularly 
compelling. 
Ideally, we would have liked to examine also how the individual answers vary across sub-
regions of the countries with different migration-related features (percentage of migrants, 
skill level of the immigrant population, integration index…). To do so, we could have used a 
set of dummy variables corresponding to each sub-region of interest. However, unfortunately, 
the ESS database does not allow us to properly identify the regions from which the 
respondents come from. 
All the variables we use in our regressions has been standardized (mean zero and variance 
one) in order to make their coefficients comparable. In case of missing values in the 
observations of the database (this happens when the respondent chose not to answer a specific 
question), we opted to report the median value of the variable of interest. We acknowledge 
that this choice has its drawbacks. However, the alternative of dropping respondents who did 
not answer any of the questions considered would have drastically reduced the size of our 
sample, thus undermining the feasibility of our statistical analysis. Instead, the route we 
followed allowed us to maintain the original number of observations, while replacing the 
missing observation with the sample data.  
Last, we should highlight a minor issue that arises when considering the case of Hungary in 
2002. In fact, for this country and for this year we could not build a variable for individual 
income due to a total lack of data. Therefore, in this case our regression model has, 
regrettably, one key variable less than the others. As we are going to show in the next 
sections, however, the insights deriving from this specific regression are nevertheless of 
interest. 
 
    5    Statistical analysis 
The following table reports the estimates of the coefficients of our linear regression model, 
using OLS, for Austria, Germany and Hungary in 2002 and in 2014 (for the detailed Stata 
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outputs and the formal definitions of the variables, see Appendix 1). The DV (‘Neg. att. 
mig.’) is the negative attitude towards migrants described in Section 4.2. 
 
Table 2. OLS regression model predicting respondents’ opinions toward migration. *= 90% significant, **= 95% 
significant, ***=99% significant. °= the level of this variable is decreasing in the reported value.  
Neg. att. mig. Aut 2002 Aut 2014 De 2002 De 2014 Hun 2002 Hun 2014 
Adjusted R^2 0.2007 0.2771 0.2431 0.2927 0.1169 0.1780 
Income 0.0202 0.0254 -0.0537*** -0.0571*** n. a. 0.1025*** 
Unemployment° -0.0124 -0.0319 -0.0367** -0.0146 -0.0375 -0.0013 
Education -0.0458** -0.1060*** -0.0543*** -0.0632*** -0.0610** -0.1012*** 
Trust politicians 0.0012 -0.0964*** -0.0465** -0.0420* -0.1035*** 0.0141 
Trust EU -0.0431* -0.0339 -0.0172 -0.0479** -0.0461* -0.0698*** 
Left-right scale 0.0758*** 0.0886*** 0.1043*** 0.1057*** -0.0311 0.1351*** 
Satisfied gov. 0.0417* -0.0668** -0.0569*** 0.0070 -0.0745** -0.0216 
Satisfied dem. -0.0352 -0.0540** -0.0849*** -0.1353*** 0.0165 -0.0722** 
Follow rules° -0.0081 -0.0859*** -0.0277 -0.0169 0.0030 -0.0105 
Feeling safe° -0.0418** 0.0122 -0.0683*** -0.0594*** -0.0636*** -0.0392* 
Mig: skill needed 0.2318*** 0.1273*** 0.1174*** 0.2325*** 0.0111 0.1703*** 
Mig: be white 0.1859*** 0.1675*** 0.1375*** 0.1334*** 0.2109*** 0.1552*** 
Traditions° -0.0504** -0.1934*** -0.2119*** -0.1676*** -0.0639*** -0.1542*** 
Political interest° 0.0397** 0.0924*** 0.0126 0.0598*** 0.0241 0.0099 
Age 0.0921*** 0.0022 0.0299* 0.0016 0.0610** 0.1113*** 
 
We should first spend a few words on the goodness of fit of the model as described by the 
values of the Adjusted R-squared (from now on, Ȓ2) for each of the regressions. The fact that 
these values are rather low (ranging from 0.29 for Germany in 2014 to 0.12 for Hungary in 
2002) tells us that the regressors considered have limited explanatory power to explain the 
overall behavior of the DV. We acknowledge that our model does not take into account all 
the factors and the variables necessary to explain a so complex and rich phenomenon as 
individual opinions on migration. However, our main objective is to assess the relative 
importance of the two alternative hypotheses we presented. Hence, what matters for our aims 
is the significance of the explanatory variables considered to be able to determine the ones 
that have greater explanatory power for the observed variation in the DV and then which of 
the two theories carries more weight. As we will see, the estimates of our model make us 
confident in this regard: for every country in each of the two periods at least half of the EVs 
considered in the regressions are significant. 
We first expose some more general findings, roughly shared by all the countries for the two 
periods, and then we examine in greater detail some other results that appear country-
specific. The main features that appear to hold regardless of the country and the period 
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considered are the following ones. As expected, there is a strong positive correlation between 
aversion to migrants and right-wing positions (‘Left-right scale’) in all the significant cases (5 
out of 6), while the relation with ‘Education’ presents even higher significance in all the six 
regressions but with the opposite sign. The profile of the individuals who are more averse to 
immigrants also reflects a moderate impact of dissatisfaction for the institutions (politicians, 
EU, government) and for the democratic rules at the status quo. This is true for all cases 
where the related variables (‘Trust politicians’, ‘Trust EU’, ‘Satisfied gov.’, ‘Satisfied dem.’) 
are significant, with the only exception of Austria 2002 where government satisfaction is 
positively correlated with the DV at a 90% level of significance. These individuals are also 
more likely to be concerned about living in a safe and secure surrounding (‘Feeling safe’; 
significantly and negatively correlated with the DV in 5 out of 6 cases), while a smaller role 
is played by the importance to follow societal rule (‘Follow rules’; significant, with a 
negative sign, only in the case of Austria 2014). Finally, for the variable ‘Age’ in all the three 
countries in 2002 and in Hungary in 2014 there is a clear positive relationship between this 
EV and adverse opinions towards migrants. For all the variables appearing in the conjectured 
relationships stated in Section 3 (1-3 for the economic argument, 1-5 for the cultural one), the 
signs of the coefficients are in line with those conjectures. 
The findings above shared by the three countries involve only the variables not specific to 
one of the two hypotheses. If we now consider our two key subsets of variables (economic 
and cultural), similarly shared results are not always present. This is still true for the two 
migration-related variables (‘Mig: skill needed’ and ‘Mig: be white’), which are strongly 
positively related with the DV and almost everywhere significant at the 99% level (with the 
exception of Hungary 2002, where the variable ‘Mig: skill needed’ is not significant at all). In 
other words, people who think that possessing the work skill needed in the receiving country 
and being white are critical preconditions for immigration are also the most hostile with 
regard to migration (from poorer, non-EU countries): no surprise. Also, the correlation 
between the importance to follow traditions and hostility to migrants is strong and positive in 
every country for both periods (‘Traditions’). But all the other variables present important 
national specificities. The last cultural variable we still have to examine, ‘Political interest’, is 
significant and positively related8 (though with a relatively low value) with the DV for both 
periods in Austria and for Germany 2014, while in the other cases is not significant. This may 
                                                          
8 Recall that political interest is decreasing in the value of this variable; same for all other variables with a ° in 
Table 2. 
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suggest that, in the significant case, political detachment can degenerate in xenophobia when 
issues such as migration are at the heart of the public debate (Austria), and that, where this 
variable is not significant, individual opinions on migrants go beyond this same 
disengagement (Hungary). 
The overall picture becomes really multifaceted when considering the two classic economic 
variables. In Austria it seems that the economic argument is simply not adequate to explain 
the DV: in fact, both in 2002 and 2014 the variables related to individual ‘Income’ and 
‘Unemployment’ are never significant. Conversely, in Germany these same variables are 
significant (except for ‘Unemployment’ in 2014) and in line with economic insecurity theory 
since income is negatively related while periods of unemployment are positively related with 
aversion to migrants. Therefore, with respect to the two sub-hypotheses presented in Section 
3.1, we see that that the labor competition channel is supported by the data on ‘Education’, 
but the evidence in favor of the second sub-hypothesis (welfare state channel) is much 
weaker. 
Moreover, with regard to ‘Income’ and ‘Unemployment’, Hungary presents a puzzle: here the 
only significant variable for the two periods is ‘Income’ in 2014. But the sign of its 
coefficient is surprisingly positive, thus implying that aversion to migrants increases with 
income. To provide a convincing explanation of this result is not easy. However, the 
following arguments seem of some relevance. First, it is important to recall that income and 
education are two variables widely considered to be highly positively related (Mincer, 1958). 
In the case of Hungary 2014 we can see that these two variables present the same value of the 
coefficient but with an opposite sign: therefore, it is reasonable to conjecture that the overall 
effect of education and income on the DV is approximately null. If this is the case, we would 
have a situation in Hungary that is closer to Austria, where again the weight of the economic 
insecurity theory is weak. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to identify some factors that can explain why for 2014 in 
Hungary the conventional negative relation between income and aversion to migrants is 
reversed. To this end, some descriptive statistics may be of help. Recalling the data of Table 
1 regarding the xenophobe vote shares in the three countries, we should similarly expect that 
a proxy for racism as indicated by the variable ‘Mig: be white’ (how important is that 
immigrants must be white) would be markedly stronger in Hungary compared to the other 
two countries. Figures 7 is revealing and well summarize this pattern: while both in Germany 
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and Austria the great majority of people does not consider being white an important 
qualification for migration, Hungary depicts a totally different reality where racism is sadly 
persistent. 
 
Figure 7. Individual answers to the question: “Qualification for immigration: be white” in Austria, Germany and Hungary, 
2014 (percentage values). 
 
 
Now we have detected an extra factor with which we must deal to analyze our regression 
model for Hungary. If we verify this is significantly and positively related with income, we 
can conclude with some confidence that the positive correlation between income and aversion 
to migrants would be in turn influenced by the racism component pervading the country at 
the wealthiest cohorts. Table 3 (see Appendix 1 for the complete Stata output) presents the 
results of a second regression where ‘Mig: be white’ is the dependent variable and ‘Income’ 
is the explanatory one (together with ‘Education, ‘Age’ and ‘Left-right scale’, these other 
variables are included to provide some rough completeness to this second model). Our 
hypothesis is confirmed: ‘Income’ is significant and positively related to the variable used as 
proxy for racism with the same magnitude of a variable naturally more relevant such as right-
wing positions (and, again ‘Income’ and ‘Education’ seem to neutralize each other). 
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Table 3. Regression model estimating the relationship between racism and income in Hungary, 2014. *= 90% significant, 
**= 95% significant, ***=99% significant. 
Mig.: be white Coefficient 
Education -0.0799*** 
Left-right scale 0.0687*** 
Income 0.0642** 
Age 0.1673*** 
 
 
Summing up, on the basis of the level of significance of the variables of interest and of the 
signs of their coefficients, the picture emerging for the three countries is the following. While 
the economic argument seems fitting only for Germany, the cultural one appears well-suited 
also for Austria and Hungary, thus suggesting an overall superiority of the explanatory power 
of the latter. 
To investigate these properties more in detail, we run two new regressions where, 
respectively, only the economic (‘Income’, ‘Unemployment’, ‘Mig: skill needed’) and the 
cultural (‘Traditions’, ‘Political interest’, ‘Mig: be white’) variables of interest are included, 
for each country in each of the two periods considered (thus, with our same initial DV 
combined with two groups of three EVs). The aim is to assess the relative goodness of fit of 
the two theories in the various cases: by comparing the Ȓ2 of the twelve regressions (six 
economic, six cultural) so obtained, we may be able to see which of the two arguments is 
prevailing. Before presenting the outputs, we should recall that, among the variables that are 
not hypothesis-specific and are so omitted in these new estimates, only ‘Education’ and ‘Age’ 
have a traceable economic component, while for the others the economic component is less 
clear and may only not be excluded a priori. Conversely, all these other variables have a clear 
cultural basis: measures of trust (‘Trust politicians’, ‘Trust EU’), institutional satisfaction 
(‘Satisfied gov.’, ‘Satisfied dem.’), ideology (‘Left-right scale’) and authoritarian values 
(‘Follow rules’, ‘Feeling safe’) are defined as cultural variables by design by Inglehart and 
Norris (2016). This is to say that, if in the following analysis the goodness of fit of the model 
with only economic variables were to prove higher, we would still not be able to discard the 
importance of the cultural hypothesis, since the cultural component is under-represented in 
this regression design due to the omission of the aforementioned variables, for which culture 
carries more weight. On the other hand, if the goodness of fit of the cultural models were to 
prevail, the omission of these variables would strengthen the claim. 
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Table 4 shows the values of the Ȓ2 for these models (we opted to omit to report the entire 
output of the regressions since the estimated coefficients of the EVs, when significant, are in 
line with the values obtained for the previous extended model). 
Table 4. Economic model versus cultural model: Ȓ2 comparison. 
ADJ R^2 Economic model Cultural model 
Austria 2002 0,12 0,12 
Austria 2014 0,07 0,19 
Germany 2002 0,08 0,16 
Germany 2014 0,15 0,17 
Hungary 2002 0,01 0,08 
Hungary 2014 0,07 0,12 
 
The results are clear: in all the cases considered, the goodness of fit of the cultural model is 
greater than or equal (only for Austria 2002) to the one of the economic model. With regard 
to the differences across countries and over time of the values of the Ȓ2, on the other hand, it 
is difficult to derive reliable insights due to the different weight that the aforementioned 
omitted variables may have in each of the cases. 
In short, the main conclusion we can draw from our statistical analysis is fairly clear and 
surprising at least in the light of the view of several scholars: individual opinions toward 
migration are substantially better explained by the cultural backlash thesis. The demand for 
close borders and, ultimately, for populism goes together with the fear of the unknown more 
than the one of being economically endangered. To provide completeness to this claim, in the 
next section we now examine what has been happening on the supply side. 
 
    6    Discussion and policy implications 
6.1   The answer of parties 
If we consider aversion to migrants and populism as a demand, coming from individuals 
revealed to have preferences led by cultural issues, the analysis of how parties and their 
political agenda reacted, adjusting so the supply to meet this new demand, should be the 
consequent step (a path followed also by Guiso et al., 2017). Identifying the response of 
political parties to the demand for populism would have not been possible in the absence of 
the findings derived from Section 4. But now, on the basis of those, we can formulate a 
hypothesis also with regard to populism and political competition: parties are expected to 
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perform better if in their political agenda issues related to culture and national identity play a 
primary role. At first sight, this may seem a too strong conclusion. However, we have already 
explained in Section 2 that policies regarding themes emerging from the discussion on 
migration are among the most compelling in the current political scene. 
A few words are now needed to better specify what is the cultural debate in politics. To this 
end, we think it is useful to recall the definition of the cultural backlash thesis developed by 
Inglehart and Norris (2016): this is considered as a traditionalist, authoritarian-seeking 
turnaround to the progressive, libertarian ‘silent revolution’ of values that has been involving 
the postwar Western societies. Now, let us examine the very popular multi-axis political 
model developed by the website Pace News Limited (see Figure 8). The cultural debate 
emphasized by Inglehart and Norris is fairly captured by the Libertarian-Authoritarian axis of 
the chart. 
  
Figure 8. Political compass. Retrieved from: politicalcompass.org. 
 
 
It is then interesting to quote a piece from the politicalcompass.org homepage: “our essential 
point is that Left and Right, although far from obsolete, are essentially a measure of 
economics. As political establishments adopt either enthusiastically or reluctantly the 
prevailing economic orthodoxy – the neo-liberal strain of capitalism – the Left-Right division 
between mainstream parties becomes increasingly blurred. Instead, party differences tend to 
be more about identity issues. In the narrowing debate, our social scale is more crucial than 
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ever.” Calling it social scale or cultural debate does not really matter: both the political 
compass and Inglehart and Norris agree on the increasing importance of this dimension, 
relative to the economic one, as characterizing differences among parties. 
The fallacy of the political compass, however, is that it provides only the political coordinates 
of an individual, a social group or a party without saying nothing on the relative weight that 
the two dimensions (economic and social/cultural) have for the same subject. For instance, it 
is almost immediate to state that the German social-democratic (SPD) party ranks in the 
libertarian-left quadrant of the chart while the German nationalist AfD ranks in the 
authoritarian-right one. Nevertheless, this classification misses the importance of the left/right 
dimension relative to the libertarian/authoritarian one. 
To this end, we resort to the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) database, whose 
authoritativeness, since its establishment in 1999, is widely recognized inside the economic 
and political research fields (Guiso et al., 2017; Bakker et al, 2015). In this survey, national 
political scientists rate European parties on a range of positions, policies and salient issues. 
This last point precisely underlines the strength of the questionnaire on which the database is 
built: the focus is not only on the mere positions of parties on a given topic, but also on the 
importance that the parties attribute to that topic. This is particularly true for the last two 
rounds of CHES (2014 and 2017), while there are very limited data on salience for the 
previous periods. Nevertheless, considering that the successes of the populist forces in 
Europe took place especially in the last five years, this should not be a big limitation. In fact, 
recalling the hypothesis stated in the first paragraph of this section, our specific aim is to 
establish whether the main parties of Austria, Germany and Hungary have been giving more 
weight in their political agenda to economic left/right themes or to cultural 
libertarian/authoritarian ones. 
A specific set of questions of the CHES database (see Appendix 2) allows us to do so for all 
the parties we intend to consider. For each country we selected the three most voted parties in 
the last round of national elections (2017 for Austria and Germany, 2018 for Hungary): 
Christian-Democratic Union (CDU), Social-Democratic Party (SPD) and Alternative for 
Germany (AfD) in Germany; Popular Party (OVP), Social-Democratic Party (SPÖ) and 
Freedom Party (FPÖ) in Austria; Fidesz, Jobbik and Socialist Party (MSZP) in Hungary. In 
this way, we ensure to have at least one establishment force and one populist force for each 
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country. Table 5 synthetizes the mean of the answers to our questions of interest (for a formal 
definition of the variables, see Appendix 2). 
 
Table 5. Parties, ideology and salience of the economic and cultural debates in Germany, Austria and Hungary. 
  
 
We report in this table the variables lrgen, lrecon and galtan as a benchmark (these are the 
simple variables identifiable also by the political compass), together with the vote shares of 
each party in the two years. However, our focus is on the last two variables which are exactly 
expressing the scale of the salience that each party is giving to the economic 
(lrecon_salience) and to the cultural (galtan_salience) debate. The information we can derive 
from this table are really interesting. Let us look first at the data for 2014. It is interesting to 
point out that the only parties which are giving a substantial importance (7 or more) to the 
cultural debate, in an authoritarian sense, are two right-wing populist parties (FPÖ and 
Jobbik, with a third one (Fidesz) approaching this value. It may not be an accident that these 
parties are already well-rooted political forces in their respective countries, one of which 
(Fidesz) is a ruling party. On the other hand, all the mainstream parties are giving more 
weight to economic issues in their political agenda. A very clear message also comes from 
Germany, where the populist forces keep the same profile of the traditional ones (see how 
2014 vote share % lrgen lrecon galtan lrecon_salience galtan_salience
CDU 37,2 5,9 5,9 6,0 8,5 5,3
SPD 29,4 3,8 3,5 4,2 8,2 5,4
AfD 1,9 8,9 8,3 8,7 8,5 5,7
SPO 26,9 3,9 2,8 4,0 7,1 4,1
OVP 24,0 6,1 6,4 7,2 7,6 5,3
FPO 20,6 8,7 5,5 8,8 5,0 7,0
MSZP 26,0 3,4 4,1 4,1 7,4 5,6
Fidesz 44,5 7,9 3,7 8,6 7,7 6,9
JOBBIK 20,5 9,7 4,0 9,5 6,0 7,4
2017 vote share % lrgen lrecon galtan lrecon_salience galtan_salience
CDU 30,2 5,6 6,1 5,9 6,7 6,1
SPD 24,6 3,9 3,4 3,6 7,3 6,3
AfD 11,5 9,2 7,6 9,5 3,5 9,3
SPO 26,9
OVP 31,5
FPO 26,0
MSZP 11,2 3 3,2 3,9 6,9 4,7
Fidesz 47,9 8,7 4,1 9,2 6,1 8,4
JOBBIK 23,2 8,5 4,2 9 5,9 7,4
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lrecon_salience and galtan_salience present close values for CDU, SPD and AfD) and their 
political weight in terms of vote shares is negligible. 
But in 2017 the situation in Germany is rather different. AfD seemed to have taken a radical 
shift, putting much more weight to the authoritarian message (9,3) and almost disregarding 
economic themes (3,5), while CDU and SPD do not show major changes in their focus. The 
effects of this change in strategy are striking, if we look at the electoral success of AfD, who, 
in just four years, saw a tenfold increase of its vote shares and succeeded in entering the 
Bundestag for the first time ever. Conversely, parties such as the Hungarian socialist party, 
which badly underestimated the importance of the cultural debate (passing from its salience 
value of 5,6 in 2014 to 4,7 in 2017) experienced a dramatic drop in their vote shares. Data for 
Austria in 2017 are unfortunately missing, but still the picture that emerges appears 
remarkable and even sharper than the one of the previous period: all the traditional parties are 
still giving more weight to the economic debate while all the populist parties are clearly more 
focused on the cultural one. In particular, it is alarming how right-wing populist forces have 
been capable of intercepting the increasing share of the individual demand looking for the 
defense of traditional values and closure to the foreign. 
6.2   How widespread is the prevalence of the cultural debate? 
The insights obtained from the previous analysis suggest that underestimating the importance 
of the libertarian versus authoritarian debate, as most traditional parties in the countries 
considered have been doing, proved self-defeating in terms of political competition. In terms 
of giving more weight to cultural themes there has been also a change on the supply side, but 
this has to a large extent been limited to the populist parties. This statement is not breaking 
news, but it has already some estimators in the literature (Stubager, 2013; Bonikowski, 2017). 
However, one may argue that the general characteristics of the countries we have considered 
(relatively prosperous, not deeply affected by the recent economic crisis and where 
migration-related issues prove quite important for the population) play an important role in 
the findings we obtained and hence that the validity of these results outside this kind of 
countries is debatable. This is the point emphasized by Rodrik (2017, p. 4): “it is easier for 
populist politicians to mobilize along ethno-national/cultural cleavages when the 
globalization shock becomes salient in the form of immigration and refugees. That is largely 
the story of advanced countries in Europe. On the other hand, it is easier to mobilize along 
income/social class lines when the globalization shock takes the form mainly of trade, 
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finance, and foreign investment. That in turn is the case with Southern Europe and Latin 
America”. Therefore, if on the one hand our findings on Austria, Germany and Hungary are 
in line with the first claim of this author, the second part of his reasoning would suggest that 
if we had instead considered countries hit hard by the economic crisis we would have 
obtained a different picture, where the weight of themes concerning identity and culture is 
less prominent. 
To verify this hypothesis, it is then necessary to examine what happened in a few countries of 
this second set. We believe that in Europe only Greece and Spain fit properly in this sense 
(we chose not include Italy because the situation of this country is more ambiguous and 
shares features of both groups). We analyze these two countries following the same method 
pursued in the previous part of this section, relying again on the data of the CHES database. 
Table 6 shows the results for Greece and Spain. They are less clear to read if compared to the 
ones of Austria, Germany and Hungary. This may reflect the greater political instability that 
characterizes Southern Europe. But the picture that emerges is by no means one supporting 
the primary role of the economic factors in the political debate, as Rodrik’s arguments might 
have predicted. Rather, we see that for SYRIZA, the left-wing populist Greek party, whose 
vote shares increased considerably from 2014 to 2017, the relative importance of the 
economic versus the cultural dimension of its political agenda (as captured by the last to 
columns) switched in favor of the latter. Similarly, Podemos in Spain experienced an 
electoral success (passing from 8% of the votes in 2014 to 21,2% in 2017) while increasing 
the relative weight of the cultural dimension in contrast to what its major opponents did (in 
the period considered, the variable galtan_salience remained stable around 7 for Podemos, 
while for the two main traditional parties PP and PSOE decreased from 7,2 to 5,9). We 
should however point out that, as claimed by Rodrik, there is still one dimension in which 
populism differs in these two groups of countries. In fact, while in the first it takes the form 
of right-wing authoritarianism (high values of the galtan variable), in Greece and Spain, 
SYRIZA and Podemos are openly libertarian and multicultural, as we can see from the very 
low value of the same variable9. 
 
                                                          
9 Interestingly, the authoritarian campaign of Golden Dawn (XA, the other populist party in Greece) did not 
increased its vote shares. 
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Table 6. Check for robustness: parties, ideology and salience of the economic and cultural debates in Greece and Spain. ND 
= New Democracy (Nea Dimokratia), XA = Golden Dawn (Chrisi Avgi); PP = People’s Party (Partido Popular), PSOE = 
Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español). 
 
 
One should be careful in drawing sharp conclusions only on the basis of this preliminary 
analysis for this second group of countries. However, the data we reported seem to reinforce 
the findings of Section 6.1 on the relevance of the cultural debate. Indeed, the cases of 
SYRIZA and Podemos show that also in Southern Europe, where the economic shocks have 
been more severe, the political strategies that proved more successful are the ones 
characterized by an intensified salience of identity themes (here on the libertarian side). To 
properly understand the causes of this pattern of political competition, it would be necessary 
to analyze the individual demand for populism, analogously to what we have done for the 
three countries examined in our paper (however, in this case, the proxy for populism must be 
different from migration, since this issue is not perceived topical in Greece and Spain, see 
again Figure 2). But still, the insight appears robust: whereas the determinants of the demand 
for populism are likely to be country-specific, the supply coming from the repositioning of 
parties has been moving across countries on the tracks of culture. 
 
    7    Conclusion: how traditional parties should react? 
The considerations that we can draw from the analysis of the data for Austria, Germany and 
Hungary considered in this work appear quite clear. First, individuals in these countries are 
concerned by migrants more because of their cultural diversity than of their potential 
2014 vote share % lrgen lrecon galtan lrecon_salience galtan_salience
SYRIZA 26,6 2 1,4 2,1 9,4 5,5
ND 22,7 7,2 7,1 7 9,4 6,3
XA 9,4 9,9 2,9 10 5,9 8,2
PP 26,1 7,3 7,7 8 8,8 7,2
PSOE 23 3,8 4,1 2,2 8,7 7,2
Podemos 8 1,7 1,3 1,8 8,8 6,9
2017 vote share % lrgen lrecon galtan lrecon_salience galtan_salience
SYRIZA 35,5 2,6 2,4 1,6 7,8 8,5
ND 28,1 7,3 8,5 7,1 8,8 5,7
XA 7,1 9,9 4,2 10 4,5 8
PP 33 7,1 7,9 8,3 8 5,9
PSOE 22,6 3,9 3,8 2,9 7,4 5,9
Podemos 21,2 2,4 1,5 1,2 7,9 7
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competition in the job market. Second, traditional parties who failed to recognize the 
importance of the political debate on the identity dimension, and to respond so to the demand 
arising from the population, saw their position weakened. As Guiso et al. (2017, p.1), 
underline, these parties have been systematically found guilty “to reduce the distance of their 
platform from that of new populist entrants, amplifying the aggregate supply of populist 
policies” (see also Brubaker, 2017). In fact, the political forces who have been more 
successful in intercepting this trend in the demand are so far mostly the populist ones. On this 
basis, we cannot say whether the winning formula is simply to highlight the cultural debate or 
also to flaunt authoritarian values. It may also be that populist forces are in possession of a 
first mover advantage: once identified the predominant dimension for voters (culture), they 
might have succeeded in exploiting it to address the issues arising from the most recent 
macro-events (globalization, new migratory wave, Islamic terrorism, with different weights 
in Central and Southern Europe). 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to surmise that the big challenge for traditional parties to 
contain the populist wave entails an effective counterattack on the same dimension of the 
debate. That is, to provide answers to these new concerns without giving up the values of 
openness and tolerance on which Western democracies are founded and that are now too 
often taken for granted. As recognized by Mounk (2018, p. 215), this is probably a forced 
solution: “we can ignore [nationalism], or wish it away. But if we abandon it, other people 
are sure to step in, prodding and baiting the beast to bring out its most ferocious side. For all 
the well-founded misgivings about nationalism, we have little choice but to domesticate it as 
best we can” (Mounk, 2018, p. 215). This ‘inclusive patriotism’ (still, in the words of Mounk, 
2018) cannot be just a matter of elitist rhetoric. Rather, it should involve rethinking the 
politics of mobilization, acting local and connecting the isolated communities (especially 
rural) where populism naturally punches through (Scoones et al., 2018). 
Again, migration policies are a crucial battlefield in this regard (Czaika and De Haas, 2013). 
Germany, for instance, courageously opened to Syrian refugees in 2014-2015 without taking 
at the same time measures to counteract the authoritarian argument against this measure. As 
Table 5 shows, xenophobe forces exploited the situation to their advantage. From this case 
we can learn the importance of migration policies that recognize the effect on the local 
population. These policies should be framed within a broader process that ensures the 
cohesion and the pluralism of the country, without neglecting the questions coming from the 
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same citizens. This may be long and difficult to implement, but it really seems a necessary 
precondition to successfully compete against populism in the era of populism. 
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Appendix 1: definition of the variables used in Section 4 (ESS database) 
1. Neg. att. mig. / SDmig: “Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside 
Europe”, scale 1 (‘Allow many’) to 4 (‘Allow none’). 
2. Income / SDincome: “Household’s total net income, all sources”, scale 1 to 10 
(increasing). 
3. Unemployment / SDun5yr: “Any period of unemployment and work seeking within 
last 5 years”, scale 1 to 2: 1 = yes, 2 = no. 
4. Eduation / SDeduys: “Years of full-time education completed.” 
5. Trust politicians / SDtrstpol: “Trust in politicians”, scale 1 (‘No trust at all’) to 10 
(‘Complete trust’). 
6. Trust EU / SDtrsteu: “Trust in the European Parliament”, scale 1 (‘No trust at all’) to 
10 (‘Complete trust’). 
7. Left-right scale / SDlrwscale: “Placement on left right scale”, scale 1 (‘Extreme left’) 
to 10 (‘Extreme right’). 
8. Satisfied gov. / SDgov: “How satisfied with the national government”, scale 1 
(‘Extreme dissatisfied’) to 10 (‘Extremely satisfied’). 
9. Satisfied dem. / SDdem: “How satisfied with the way democracy works in country”, 
scale 1 (‘Extreme dissatisfied’) to 10 (‘Extremely satisfied’). 
10. Follow rules / SD(ipf)rule: “Important to do what is told and follow rules”, scale 1 
(‘Very important’) to 5 (‘Not important’). 
11. Feeling safe / SD(imp)safe: “Important to live in secure and safe surroundings”, scale 
1 (‘Very important’) to 5 (‘Not important’). 
12. Mig.: skill needed / SDmigskill: “Qualification for immigration: work skills needed in 
country”, scale 1 (‘Extremely unimportant’) to 10 (‘Extremely important). 
13. Mig.: be white / SDmigwht: Qualification for immigration: be white”, scale 1 
(‘Extremely unimportant’) to 10 (‘Extremely important). 
14. Traditions / SDtrad: “Better for a country if almost everyone shares customs and 
traditions”, scale 1 (‘Agree strongly’) to 5 (‘Disagree strongly’). 
15. Political interest / SDpolint(r): “How interested in politics”, scale 1 (‘Very interested’) 
to 4 (‘Not at all’). 
16. Age / SDage(a) “Age of respondent.” 
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Table 7. Regression model: Austria, 2002. 
 
 
Table 8. Regression model: Austria, 2014. 
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Table 9. Regression model: Germany, 2002. 
 
 
Table 10. Regression model: Germany, 2014. 
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Table 11. Regression model: Hungary, 2002. 
 
 
Table 12. Regression model: Hungary, 2014. 
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Table 13. Regression model estimating the relationship between racism and income in Hungary, 2014. 
 
 
Appendix 2: definition of the variables used in Section 5 (CHES database) 
1. lrgen: “Please tick the box that best describes each party's overall ideology on a scale 
ranging from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right).” 
2. lrecon: “Parties can be classified in terms of their stance on economic issues. Parties 
on the economic left want government to play an active role in the economy. Parties 
on the economic right emphasize a reduced economic role for government: 
privatization, lower taxes, less regulation, less government spending, and a leaner 
welfare state”, scale 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right). 
3. lrecon_salience: “Next, we would like you to think about the salience of economic 
issues for a party. Over the course of 20xx, how important were economic issues to 
the parties in their public stance?”, scale 0 (no importance) to 10 (great importance). 
4. galtan: “Parties can be classified in terms of their views on democratic freedoms and 
rights. ‘Libertarian’ or ‘postmaterialist’ parties favor expanded personal freedoms, for 
example, access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or greater 
democratic participation. ‘Traditional’ or ‘authoritarian’ parties often reject these 
ideas; they value order, tradition, and stability, and believe that the government 
should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues”, scale 0 
(libertarian/postmaterialist) to 10 (traditional/authoritarian). 
5. galtan_salience: “Over the course of 20xx, how important were libertarian/traditional 
issues to the parties in their public stance?”, scale 0 (no importance) to 10 (great 
importance). 
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